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SYMPOSIUM: SPORTS LAW IN THE 21st CENTURY
GLOBALIZING SPORTS LAW
JAMiEs A.R. NAFZIGER*
During the summer of 1778, the Fabronis, a noble family living in
Tuscany, requested their Community Magistrate to prohibit ball games
that had been held "since time immemorial' in the public square in front
of their house. The Community Magistrate refused to do so.' The ball
games, therefore, took place on schedule. In subsequent proceedings,3
the Fabronis requested damages from the responsible team for injury
allegedly caused by stray balls that hit their house during the games.4
Ultimately, one of the highest courts in Tuscany, the Rota Fiorentina,
denied relief to the Fabronis. 5 The court ruled, in effect, that they had
come to the nuisance. Because there was nothing new or unusual about
the annual ball games, the court found that any harm the Fabronis might
* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law.
1. See Gino Gorla, A Decision of the Rota Fiortentina of 1780 on Liability for Damages
Caused by the "Ball Game," 49 TuL. L. Rnv. 346, 349 (1975).
2. The Community Magistrate was apparently an administrative body that, having denied
the Fabronis' request for an injunction against the ball games, had no jurisdiction to address
their request for damages. See id. at 350. On the same date, the Community Magistrate,
acting on the request of the Auditore Fiscale, one of the highest agents of the Grandduke of
Thscany, determined that the ball game, as usual, could be conveniently played only in the
public square in front of the Fabronis' house. See id. at 350-51. The Fabronis filed no appeal
of either decision.
3. Before the commencement of the ball games, the Fabronis had filed a second action in
the Vicario, the ordinary local court. They requested damages for any injury to their property
that might result and a cautio de damno infecto (a kind of warranty or suretyship to cover
estimated damages). When a private citizen provided a personal suretyship (cautio) to the
Fabronis, the games proceeded as scheduled without prejudice to later consideration of the
claim for damages. See id. at 351. After the alleged injury to the Fabronis' property, the
Vicario ordered partial payment of damages. Both parties appealed this decision to the
Magistrato Supremo in Florence. The Magistrato Supremo commissioned the Rota Floren-
tina to hear the appeals. See id.
4. See Gorla, supra note 2, at 351. Anyone who has witnessed a traditional game of gioco
del pallone, at issue in the Fabronis' action, or gioco del calcio, as played in Florence and
Lucca, will appreciate the risk to life and limb, if not the Fabroni's property. The medieval
game of calcio I attended in 1997 on the Piazza di Santa Croce in Florence was the longest
sustained free-for-all I have ever witnessed. Stray balls seemed far less threatening, however,
than stray fists, strangleholds and kicks administered by the players.
5. See Marradiensis Praetensae Refectionis Damnorum, 2 COLLEZIONE COMfPLETA
DELLE DECIsIom DELL 'AuDrroRE GIUSEPPE VERNACCINI 279 (1824), cited in Gorla, supra
note 2, at 347 n.5.
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have suffered was merely "natural and intrinsic'' 6 to the games. The
legal rationale for this vindication of sports over torts seems to have
been that well-established public amusements create a legal servitude on
neighboring property.7
Granted, this case is not within the mainstream of sports and torts.
And what does an eighteenth century decision have to do with "Sports
Law in the Twenty-First Century?" After all, the modem Italian Civil
Code would probably reach the opposite result and award damages to
the Fabronis, on a theory of strict liability.'
I. USE AND NON-USE OF FOREIGN AND INrERNATIONAL
LEGAL AuTHoRiTY
What is of interest, however, is that the Tuscan courts relied on for-
eign legal authority9 and the jus commune that had evolved as a form of
international law for over a thousand years. This body of transnational
tort law was derived from the Lex Aquilia in the Justinian's Digest.'° For
the Tuscan courts, making use of this authority was doing what came
naturally. They were simply applying a law that they assumed had more
or less universal application, at least in Europe and America. The law of
the eighteenth century had roots and the law had branches.
Even today, Italian courts routinely consult foreign and international
sources, as do jurists throughout Europe." Contrast American sports
law today. It is extremely rare to find any judicial recognition of either
6. See Gorla, supra note 2, at 355.
7. See id. at 356.
8. See C.c.ART. 2050 (1969) of the Italian Code, which is apparently the most specific
provision on point, reads as follows:
Liability arising from exercise of dangerous activities. Whoever causes injury to an-
other in the performance of an activity dangerous by its nature or by reason of the
instrumentalities employed, is liable for damages, unless he proves that he has taken all
suitable measures to avoid the injury.
ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 504 (Mario Beltramo, Giovanno Longo & John Henry Merryman trans.,
1969).
9. See Gorla, supra note 2, at 347-48 (mostly French authority).
10. The Lex Aquilia was the basic Roman law of obligations. The Roman legal tradition
encouraged jurists to make analogies argumenta a similibus to provisions in the Digest. The
Rota Fiorentina therefore applied the advice about the appropriate rule of Roman law found
in DIGEST 9.2, 11, which describes a case in which a stray ball struck the hand of a barber
while he was shaving a customer, thereby causing the barber to cut the customer's throat. The
jurisconsult held that the barber, not the player, was liable for damages to the customer be-
cause the barber had willingly conducted his trade where it was customary to play the ball
game. See id. at 353-54 n.30. One is reminded of the clear and present danger to property
owners today of stray golf balls.
11. See, e.g., Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-And Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 198, 210 (1977).
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historical context, other than formal precedent, or international author-
ity for ordinary decisions. Although American courts routinely hear,
and typically dismiss, cases that involve international competition, they
decide those cases as if all that matters are their own world views. It is
the wonderworld of West Reporters more than the real world.
The notorious case of Butch Reynolds"2 speaks volumes on the insu-
larity of American sports law. In that bizarre, three-year circus of fed-
eral litigation in Ohio, each judicial performer offered a surprise. Even
though the substance of the dispute was centered entirely in Europe,
neither the federal district nor appellate courts paid any attention what-
soever to foreign or international law.13 Small wonder that the courts
never really came to grips with the issue of what binding effect, under
treaty law, should be given to a foreign arbitral award that had been
rendered abroad against Reynolds. 4 Small wonder that both the parties
and the judges overlooked what was essentially a choice-of-law issue
masquerading as a jurisdictional issue. 5 Small wonder, then, that the
courts simply assumed, without blinking an eye, that the law of Ohio
applied. 6 Small wonder that the case careened between a $27 million
12. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n., 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 423 (1994) (reversing No. C-2-92-452 slip. op. (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 3, 1992) as modified,
No. C-2-92-452 slip. op. (S.D. Ohio, July 13, 1993)). See also 841 F.Supp. 1444 (S.D. Ohio
1992), stay of preliminary injunction granted, 968 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1992) (Table) application
for emergency stay granted, 112 S. Ct. 2512 (1992); No. C-2-91-003, 1991 WL 179760 (S.D.
Ohio, Mar. 19, 1991), vacated and remanded, sub nom., Reynolds v. Athletics Congress, 935
F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1991) (Table). For an analysis of this litigation, see James A.R. Nafziger,
International Sports Law as a Process for Resolving Disputes, 45 IT'L & Comn'. L.Q. 130, 134
(1996).
13. See Nafziger, supra note 12, at 134.
14. This issue involved the enforceability of an arbitral award affecting Reynolds, who
had not signed an agreement to have his claim resolved by arbitration between his national
governing body, The Athletics Congress of the United States (T.A.C.), and its parent federa-
tion, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (I.A.A.F.). Even though Reynolds had
not agreed in writing to the arbitration, he and his attorneys did attend and testify in the
arbitral proceedings, including examining and cross-examining witnesses. See id. at 134.
Reynolds thus appears to have waived any objection to the proceeding. The arbitrators ruled
against Reynolds, finding there was "no doubt" about his use of a banned substance and
upholding a two-year suspension of his eligibility for internationally sanctioned competition.
See id. Because the United States is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, it is
unclear under these circumstances why the federal court did not enforce the award. Even
though Reynolds had not formally signed an agreement to have his claim resolved in this way,
the fact remains that Reynolds and his attorneys participated fully in the arbitration. More-
over, he was bound by the rules of the T.A.C. and the I.A.A.F., including their provisions for
resolving disputes of this sort.
15. See id. at 136-40.
16. See id. at 139.
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default judgment in favor of the plaintiff' 7 and ultimate dismissal of his
action.' 8 Small wonder that, at the end of the day, the case will go down
as little more than a futile exercise in the verbal gymnastics of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington19 rather than a useful statement about the
enforceability of arbitral awards and the quasi-judicial competence of
sports associations to resolve eligibility disputes of this sort. The Reyn-
olds saga is not alone in revealing these kinds of problems, but it is cer-
tainly a prime example of what can go wrong when the ball is in the
wrong court of law or, for that matter, in any court of law.
Fortunately, national courts are reluctant to hear international sports
disputes.20 As the federal district court in Oregon wrote in the Tonya
Harding case,
The courts should rightly hesitate before intervening in discipli-
nary hearings held by private associations... Intervention is ap-
propriate only in the most extraordinary circumstances, where the
association has clearly breached its own rules, that breach will im-
minently result in serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff has exhausted all internal remedies. Even then,
injunctive relief is limited to correcting the breach of the rules.
The court should not intervene in the merits of the underlying
dispute.21
17. No. C-2-92-452 slip op. (S.D. Ohio 1993).
18. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1110.
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ("minimum contacts" test for specific personal jurisdiction). Of
particular importance is the "purposeful availment" test fashioned in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958). The district and appellate courts failed to consider the issue of general juris-
diction, according to which the TACBIAAF's systematic and continuous presence in Ohio
would have clearly brought the two vested organizations within the court's power to hear the
matter.
20. In the United States, for example, federal courts seldom allow private causes of action
to proceed against sports bodies or federations. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Behagen v. Athletics Congress, 884 F.2d
524 (10th Cir. 1989); Martinez v. United States Olympic Comm., 802 F.2d 1275,1281 (10th Cir.
1986); Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985); Michels v. United States
Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984); Myricks v. United States Olympic Comm., CV
90-2381-WMB (C.D. Cal. June 18, 1990); Cady & Powell v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A.,
C 89-1737-SC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1989); DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F.
Supp. 1181 (D.C. 1980); Walton-Floyd v. United States Olympic Comm., 965 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.
App. 1st Dist. 1998). As Walton-Floyd notes, 965 S.W. 2d at 38 n.1, courts have been willing to
hear such disputes only between organizations (United States Wrestling Fed'n v. Wrestling
Div., 545 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (N.D. Ohio 1982), as provided by federal statutory law, or when
the disputes were premised in breach of contract claims (Harding v. United States Figure
Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Or. 1994)); Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n,
841 F. Supp. 1444 (S.D. Ohio 1992)). In neither of the latter actions did the plaintiff succeed.
21. 851 F. Supp. 1476. Amendments enacted in 1998 to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978
bar injunctions against the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) within 21 days of the
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Two years ago my law school hosted a German scholar who was
working on a comparison of German and American methods for resolv-
ing sports disputes.22 At the beginning of his semester with us, I took
him on a quick tour of such peculiarities of American sports law as the
anti-trust exemption for baseball, major league franchising, Title IX, and
free agency. Later, he was ready to tackle the state action requirement
in due process litigation, which may be even more puzzling to foreigners
than it is to us. As time went on, we also discussed rules for allocating
broadcast time and revenue, NCAA scholarship rules, and the "death
penalty." Just describing the curiosities of American sports law really
opened my eyes. Much of what I had taken for granted began to stand
out for the first time. My German colleague's observations about Euro-
pean Union and German practices strengthened my understanding, by
contrast, of our different approaches to regulating sports activity and
what we can learn from each other.
My point then, is not that we should change our ways. We are enti-
tled to do things our way. We are even entitled to legal curiosities. My
point is, rather, that we need to take greater account of what is going on
in the outside world. We have much to gain from comparative insights.23
And we need to address the issues within a prescribed framework of
international law.24
start of the Olympics, Paralympics, or Pan American Games so long as the USOC provides a
sworn statement that it cannot resolve the underlying dispute before the beginning of the
games. The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Amendments to the Amateur Sports Act] (emphasis
added).
22. See MARKus BUCHBERGER, Dm OBERPROFBARKEIT SPORVERBANDSRECHTLICHER
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DURCH DIE ORDENTLICH GERICHTSBARKEIT: EIN VERGLEICH DER RECHT-
SLAGE IN DER BUNDsSREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UND DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON
A~mEKA (1997) (copy on file at Willamette University with the author) (comparison of Ger-
man and United States resolution of sports disputes).
23. Comparative sports law is in its infancy. Analysis is largely confined to specific issues,
such as justiciability and judicial review of sports disputes, eligibility of athletes for competi-
tion, and commercial sponsorships and marketing of athletes and competition. More compre-
hensive studies have focused largely on the growth of a European regime of sports law.
Although national programs in such countries as the former Soviet Union, the former East
Germany and Cuba have attracted much public attention, there has been very little compara-
tive scholarship on sports regimes outside the western industrialized countries. See James
A.R. Nafziger & Li Wei, China's Sports Law, 46 AM. J. Cown. L. 201,202-03 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
24. See generally JAms A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPoRTS LAW (1988); James
A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends, 86 ANi. J.
INr'L L. 489 (1992).
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International sports law is fundamentally a process, not a set of rules.
It embraces a variety of institutions, including sports associations, inter-
national federations (IFs), national Olympic committees (NOCs), the In-
ternational Olympic Committee (IOC), arbitral bodies, and national
courts.' The relationship among relevant institutions in a given dispute
is often complicated and, from the standpoint of athletes, unfair. Sports
lawyers therefore have a big job ahead. Our task is, first, to clarify the
relationships among the various institutions in order to avoid unneces-
sary confusion and transaction costs resulting from the jurisdictional
conflicts that bedevil resolution of sports disputes today. A second task
will be to establish new institutions to handle issues more effectively. It
is time, for example, to establish a single agency independent of sports
associations and federations to administer drug tests and provide serv-
ices to resolve disputes arising out of those tests.
Foreign approaches to jurisdictional problems in the sports arena are
instructive. Consider European Court of Justice rulings on the review-
ability of inter-club player transfers,2 6 or German constitutional jurisdic-
tion to protect athletes regardless of state action. 7 Consider Chinese
mediation techniques to resolve disputes 8 or English judicial abstention
from reviewing decisions of domestic (private) tribunals.2 9
A recent Canadian decision is a good example of the kind of gui-
dance foreign law can provide to delineate jurisdiction between private
judicial tribunals. In McCaig v. Canadian Yachting Ass'n & Canadian
Olympic Ass'n, 31 the plaintiffs, Murray and Amy McCaig, sought a dec-
laration that the respondent, the Canadian Yachting Association (CYA),
had ignored an agreement between them that provided for two regattas
in order to select the Canadian team for the Mistral class of sailboarding
25. See Nafziger, supra note 12, at 133.
26. See Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association ASBL & Ors. v. Bos-
man, Case C-415/93 [1995] ICEC 38.
27. See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48
MD. L. REv. 247 (1989).
28. See Nafziger & Wei, supra note 24, at 218-19, 226. China's new sports law provides
that "[a]ny disputes arising in competitive sports shall be subject to mediation and arbitration
by a sports arbitration body (emphasis added)." See id.
29. See Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1302, 1307 (1983); McIn-
nes v. Onslow Fane, 3 All E.R. at 211, 223 (1978) (Eng.) ("This is so even where those bodies
are concerned with the means of livelihood of those who take part in those activities."); ac-
cord, R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd., Ex parte Lain, 2 Q.B. 864, 882 (1967). See
generally Edward Grayson, Reviewing Sporting Bodies, 141 N-w L.J. 1113 (1991).
30. McCaig & McCaig v. Canadian Yachting Ass'n, Case #90-01-96624 (Q.B. Winnipeg
Centre 1996). The author is grateful to Richard Pound for sending him a copy of this opinion.
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competition in the 1996 Olympic Games.3' In fact, only one regatta was
held because of poor wind conditions that precluded the scheduling of a
second regatta and the CYA refused to reschedule it.32 The McCaigs
therefore sought an order directing the CYA to conduct a second regatta
to complete the criteria for team selection.33
The court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had already had
their day in court, and that court was the CYA.34 A decision by the CYA
appeals body was final. The court's decision rested on an interpretation
of the agreement between the McCaigs and the CYA.35 In the absence
of a provision for an alternative if two regattas could not be held, with-
out fault by either party, the court deferred to what it described as a
reasonable construction of the McCaig's agreement by the CYA.36 Ac-
cording to the court, "[t]he bodies which heard the appeals were exper-
ienced and knowledgeable in the sport of sailing, and fully aware of the
selection process. The appeals bodies determined that the selection cri-
teria had been met. '37 Significantly, the deciding judge wrote as follows:
"[a]s persons knowledgeable in the sport and the contractual language, I
would be reluctant to substitute my opinion for those who know the
sport and knew the nature of the problem."3 He expressed "profound
regret that the parties have ended up in court when one realizes that all
are genuinely concerned about encouraging our best athletes to achieve
their highest level of skills for themselves and their country. '39
I1. THE PERILS OF LITIGATION AND THE PROMISE OF THE COURT OF
ARBrIRATION FOR SPORT
Litigation is rarely the best means for resolving international sports
disputes.4 ° Only in extraordinary circumstances does due process justify
litigation of the kinds of disputes that have come before courts. Usually,
there are better alternatives. National governing bodies and interna-
tional federations are beginning to find the funds and gain the experi-
ence to do a better job of counseling athletes, handling issues as they
31. See i
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id
35. See McCaig, #90-01-96624
36. See id.
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id.
40. See supra note 21.
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arise, and resolving disputes on their own. An independent drug-test
administering agency is needed, however, in order to relieve these orga-
nizations of the suspicions, tensions and serious disputes that often ac-
company drug testing.
In the process of international sports law, the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS) 41 is gradually assuming a central position in resolving
disputes.42 As a result, the CAS is generating special law (lex specialis)
to guide other institutions, including national courts.43 The establish-
ment of on-site CAS panels at the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Nagano
and Sydney and the establishment of CAS courts in Sydney and Denver
have confirmed this trend in dispute resolution.'
So far, the CAS has decided over 200 cases, resulting in more than
fifty arbitral awards, ten advisory opinions, and "many amicable settle-
ments. 45 Of ten recent CAS cases, six involved charges of coping
against athletes, two involved non-doping issues of eligibility for compe-
tition, one related to an endorsement contract between two private com-
panies, and one concerned violence between two national teams in
international competition.46
Although it is still too early to identify any clear jurisprudential
trends among CAS awards, a summary of them is instructive. First, de-
spite a general rule among IFs of strict liability for doping, several of the
41. The CAS is governed by a Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, Procedural Rules, and
Rules for Resolution of Disputes Arising During the Olympic Games. Court of Arbitration
for Sport, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBiRA TON (1995). For descriptions of the CAS and
its work, see Luigi Fumagalli, II Tribunal Arbitrale dello Sport: Bilancio dell'Attivitd e Prospet-
tive Future, 47 RIVISTA DI Dimro SPoRTIVO 715 (1995); Nafziger, supra note 24; Matthieu
Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): An Institution for Settling Sports-Related
Disputes by Arbitration, in SPORTS & EuROPEAN CoMMUNIrry LAw 199 (D. Panagiotopoulos
ed. 1998); Jean-Philippe Rochat, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, 26 OLYMPIC REv., 73
(1997).
42. The CAS resolves:
disputes of a private nature arising out of the practice or development of sport, and in a
general way, all activities pertaining to sport and whose settlement is not otherwise
provided for in the Olympic Charter. Such disputes may bear on questions of principle
relating to sport or on pecuniary or other interests....
Art. 4, Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (emphasis added).
43. See Reeb, supra note 41, at 199; Rochat, supra note 41, at 73.
44. See Reeb, supra note 41, at 205.
45. See id. at 200; Remarks of Matthieu Reeb, the Hague's 750th Anniversary Interna-
tional Law Conference, July 3, 1998.
46. See Nagano (NAG) 4 & 5 (1998); NAG 2 (1998); Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS) 96-
157 (1997); TAS 96/156 (1997); TAS 96/149 (1997); TAS 96/153 (1996); TAS 951150 (1996);
TAS 95/141 (1996); TAX 94/129 (1995); TAS Award of March 30, 1994.
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awards disclose CAS efforts to avoid unnecessarily harsh results.47 Prin-
ciples of equity seem to play a role.
Second, in determining the validity of anti-doping sanctions against
athletes, the CAS has insisted on high and clearly expressed standards
and strict compliance with formal requirements. It has relied on the
IOCs Medical Code and Drug Formulary Guides, rather than its own
interpretations of doping. In a celebrated case at the Nagano Games,48
Canadian Ross Rebagliati briefly lost his gold medal in the snowboard-
ing giant slalom when he tested positive for marijuana. The CAS found,
under the Medical Code, that the IOC had no competency to disqualify
Rebagliati in the absence of the requisite agreement between the IOC
and the International Skiing Federation (FIS) to provide for marijuana
testing. The CAS further found that marijuana was not listed as a
banned substance in the IOCs Drug Formulary Guide that had been
published for athletes participating in the Nagano games.
Third, an important advisory opinion of the CAS helped resolve ju-
risdictional issues in doping cases by establishing the priority of IFs over
NOCs.4 9 Finally, the CAS has not hesitated to reprimand NOCs for vio-
lating rules of fair play. In one case at the Nagano Games the CAS
reprimanded the Czech NOC for contesting the eligibility of a United
States naturalized hockey player who had played for the Swedish team.
Despite its conclusion that the player had been ineligible to compete in
matches already concluded in Nagano, the CAS refused to order forfei-
ture of the disputed matches involving the Swedish team. Forfeiture
would have accrued in the standings to the advantage of the Czech
team.50
III. AN AGENDA FOR GLOBALIZATION
The growing importance of the CAS in resolving disputes highlights a
trend toward collaboration rather than confrontation off the playing
field. Unfortunately, the dominant issue of steroids and other doping
agents seems to be litigation-prone. The argument is that doping issues
cannot be resolved by negotiation or mediation because they require the
evidentiary rules and binding, up-or-down solutions that the courts are
best equipped to provide. I would suggest, however, that we need to
47. See Aaron N. Wise, Sports Governing Bodies' Strict Liability Drug Rule Standards, 14
SPoRTs LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 14.
48. See CAS award in NAG 2 (1998).
49. See TAS 94/128 (1995).
50. See award in NAG 4 & 5 (1998).
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refocus our attention. We need to put more emphasis on education,
global standardization of drug-testing, more extensive and reliable test-
ing, protection of confidential testing information, proper supervision of
lab procedures, and clear rules of evidence in resolving disputes about
alleged doping. If we do better along these lines, I think we can largely
ensure athletes of due process or natural justice and thereby avoid litiga-
tion except in rare cases.
Sadly, of course, drug-popping is rampant,5 ' enforcement of controls
is spotty at best, testing procedures are too often controversial, standards
vary wildly among national sports bodies and IFs, and administrative re-
view of doping issues is often deficient.52 But the regulatory regime of
the IOC and the IFs is improving.53 Gradually, the CAS is developing
an interpretive jurisprudence to strengthen this regime.54 It is often two
steps forward and one step backward, but the responsible institutions are
making progress.
As the process of collaboration develops into a principal means for
avoiding and resolving issues in the international sports arena, athletes
and sports bodies will all have to abide by an ethic of fair play. For
example, the United States and British NOCs unsuccessfully requested a
rewriting of Olympic history to take account of systematic doping of
medal-winning East Germans years ago.55 Totally aside from the feasi-
bility of rewriting history, strictly as a matter of fair play, the USOC
51, See, e.g., David Walsh, Drugs Push Sport, SUNDAY TInEs (London), Aug. 2, 1998, at 8;
Tour de France Hit by Drugs Admission, July 26, 1998, FINANCIAL TrMs, July 25-26, 1998, at
3.
52. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, Jr., To Fight Drugs, LO.C.
Needs Outside Help: Summit Must Do More Than Redefine Doping, N.Y. Tnvms, Aug. 16,
1998, at 11; Ira Berkow, Suspect Samples, but FINA's Testing Is Marred, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1998, at 4.
53. See, e.g, Prince Alexandre de Merode, Doping: Seeking the Causes, 26 OLYMPIC REV.,
Oct.-Nov. 1998, at 5; The World Conference on Doping in Sport, 26 OLYNIc REv., Oct.-Nov.
1998, at 9; Doping: The Historic Agreement, OLYMPIC REv., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 15; Building a
Peaceful and Better World Through Sport and the Olympic Ideal, U.N. Doc. A/50/L.15, U.N.
General Assembly, 49th Sess. (1994). But see, 10C Bid to Tackle "Complex Problem" Bound
to Fall Short, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at 4E. IOC efforts are based on the International
Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport, reproduced in 26 OLYwIc Rnv., Aug.-Sept. 1998,
at 7.
54. See Matthieu Reeb, General Principles of CAS Case Law in Doping Issues, 26
OLY ipic REv., Feb.-March 1998, at 67.
55. See Christopher Clarey, British Swimmer Is Aiming for Justice, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 13,
1998, at D4; Jere Longman, U.S. Seeks Redress for 1976 Doping in Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 1998, at 1. The IOC declined, however, to implement these requests. Christopher Clarey,
East Germans Will Keep Medals From '76 Olympics, N.Y. TMws, Dec. 13, 1998, at 10 (con-
cluding that there were too many variables and no legal basis in withdrawing and reawarding
medals).
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could not have expected to be successful in this effort because of the
incidence of doping among its own athletes. To cite another example, as
baseball players take their place in the Olympic pantheon, 6 how can the
USOC turn a blind eye to professional baseball's tolerance of doping? 7
How fair is it to have allowed Mark McGwire to use androstenedione, a
performance-enhancing supplement, on his way to becoming an Ameri-
can hero58 while shot put gold medalist Randy Barnes, after a similar
practice, was banned for life from sanctioned competition in his sport?59
A foolish consistency may be the hobgoblin of little minds, but a wise
consistency in combating doping and resolving other issues throughout
the sports world will take big minds in the twenty-first century.
IV. THE ROLE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
In twenty-five years we may wonder what became of anti-trust, labor
law, and civil rights issues as the dominant themes of sports law. Quite
likely, these kinds of issues will remain important but will no longer be
dominant. Instead, issues of international eligibility, contracting, mar-
keting, intellectual property rights, and dispute resolution will loom
much larger. Sports activity across a full range of remuneration and
commercialization is less and less constrained by national boundaries.
The globalization of the sports arena is inevitable.
In training tomorrow's lawyers and sports professionals, legal educa-
tion therefore has a responsibility to broaden the horizons of law stu-
dents and non-law students alike to include the international dimensions
of sports law. Legal educators can play four important roles to prepare
students for the future: we can globalize otherwise strictly domestic
courses in sports law, supplement courses in international law, offer sem-
inars focused on international sports law, and add a new dimension to
courses in exercise science and sports management.
56. Baseball was played for the first time as an official Olympic sport at the 1992 Games
in Barcelona. 26 OLYMPIC Rnv., Oct. 1992, at 498. The International Baseball Association is
the sport's governing body. Bob Rybarczyk, Baseball, A User's Guide, OLYaMIc REV., July/
Aug. 1992, at 374.
57. See generally, Baseball, Studying Use of Androstenedione, STATESrAN-JOURNAL (Sa-
lem, Or.), Dec. 9, 1998, at 5B (pointing out that the baseball players' association will not agree
to random testing of athletes and that the steroid androstenedione, which is banned in other
sports and in most international competition, has not been banned in professional baseball).
58. See Joe Drape, McGwire Admits Taking Controversial Substance, N.Y. TIMp-s, Aug.
22, 1998, at C3.
59. See id.; Year of Drugs: From Baseball to Swimming, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at 4E.
Barnes incurred the lifetime ban rather than a lesser sanction (but nevertheless a sanction)
because the underlying offense was his second.
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In basic courses in sports law, the teacher's job is getting easier be-
cause the leading text books have introduced materials on Olympic
sports.60 This is a welcome, if not overdue, development. Related notes
and questions in the standard texts are particularly illuminating. More
needs to be done, however, to give students a sense of the full scope of
international sports law and particularly the significant relationships
among pertinent decision-making bodies. This is a tall order, given the
complexity of decision-making affecting international sports activity and
athletes. The process is confusing even just within the Olympic Move-
ment and related open competition, not to mention in non-Olympic
sports and in the professional arena. The Foschi case,6 involving the
issue of strict liability for the presence of drugs during routine testing,
offers a superb glimpse of the problem of jurisdictional complexity and
alternative solutions.
It is very much to the credit of sports law scholars that the principal
teaching materials, unlike those for basic courses in international and
comparative law, highlight such fundamental issues of international ath-
letic competition as eligibility, gender issues, international politics, juris-
diction to regulate, and so on. It is high time that international and
comparative scholars follow the lead of sports law scholars.
In professional research and in the development of teaching materi-
als in sports law, however, we need to get beyond the handful of appel-
late court opinions that have attracted repeated attention. Most of these
have simply confirmed an extension into the international arena of the
Tarkanian62 state action principle so as to deny judicial standing to ath-
letes. Relying on the notorious Reynolds litigation 63 to establish useful
60. See, e.g., PAUL C. WElLER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998); RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MAT IALS (3d ed.
1997).
61. Foschi v. F6ddration Internationale de Natation Amateure (FINA), TAS 96/156
(1997); In the Matter of Arbitration Between Jessica K. Foschi & United States Swimming,
Inc., American Arbitration Association, Case #77-190-0036-96 (1996). See N.Y. TDMES, June
19, 1997, at B-16; John Jeansonne, Swim Ban is Overturned, NEWSDAY, June 18, 1997, at A61;
73 WORLD PRESS REv., July 1, 1996, at 51; David A. Botwinik & Diane Rapisarda, Under the
Amateur Sports Act, All Disputes Between American Athletes and the U.S. Olympic Committee
Must be Submitted to Arbitration for Resolution, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1996, at B5, B6.
62. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
63. See Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994) (rev'g No. C-2-92-452 slip. op. (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 3, 1992), as
modified, No. C-2-92-452 Slip. op. (S.D. Ohio, July 13, 1993)). See also prior proceedings in
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8625, at *1, stay of preliminary injunction granted, 968 F.2d 1216 (6th
Cir. 1992) (Table), application for emergency stay granted, 112 S. Ct. 2512 (1992); No. C-2-91-
003, 1991 WL 179760 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 19, 1991), vacated and remanded, sub nom. Reynolds
v. Athletics Congress, 935 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1991) (Table).
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rules and principles of international sports law is a little like relying ex-
clusively on Dred Scott64 to teach a course in constitutional law. The
best materials would include several sources in addition to appellate de-
cisions and commentary: national legislation, international practice, the
emerging special law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and scholarly
commentary.
In the classroom, I have gotten good mileage out of current events.
Major competition such as the Olympics provides a high-visibility con-
text for productive discussion, but issues and developments can pop up
at any time to spark the students' interest. One example involved the
allegations of payoffs to secure IOC approval of Salt Lake City to host
the Winter Games.6 6 The surrounding issues are a matter not only of
sports law but of local government law, professional ethics, conflict of
laws, and business organizations, for example. Current developments in
the sports arena can therefore help teach a broad range of courses. In-
deed, teaching international sports law is a particular opportunity and
challenge because it straddles so many fields in the academic curriculum.
How many students of disabilities law know, for example, that the Ama-
teur Sports Act67 now covers Paralympic games and how many students
of administrative law know about the ombudsman for athletes?6 s
As an authoritative process of decision and legal discipline, interna-
tional sports law is as much a matter of international law as sports law.
In a basic course in international law, sports competition therefore is a
superb theme with which to engage students and to highlight a variety of
issues about the sources of international law, the reality of the transna-
tional legal process, the siren song of sovereign politics, and the
problems and opportunities of concurrent jurisdiction. The Olympic
Movement provides a fascinating example of the role of non-govern-
mental organizations in the international legal process. I have therefore
regularly lectured on that topic during a basic course in International
64. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
65. An excellent introduction to this approach may be found in the chapter on interna-
tional sports found in WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPoRTs LAW (1993). For a list of published
scholarship, see generally JOHN HLADczuK ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND LEGISLATION: AN AN-
NOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 115-23 (1991).
66. See Mike Dodd, Let the Cleanup Begin, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at § 1E (Spec.
Supp.) (summarizing investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, 10C, USOC, and Salt
Lake Organizing Committee); Jere Longman, Purity vs. Reality: Scandal Points Out Pressure
in Quest for the Olympics, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 20, 1998, at 1; Jere Longman, More Reports of
IOC Favors Emerge in Utah., N.Y. Trvms, Dec. 18, 1998, at D1.
67. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-96 (1994).
68. See 1998 Amendments to the Amateur Sports Act, 112 Stat. 2681
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Law and Dispute Resolution. Beginning in the 1980's, I have also taught
international sports law as a focus of an advanced seminar in interna-
tional legal problems. A seminar in international sports law of this sort
is instructive for future international lawyers and sports lawyers alike.
As to comparative law, my own research and published writing has been
limited to British and Chinese sports law. Although I have not figured
out a way to bring together the disparate strands of foreign sports law
into a tight mesh, I have found that individual insights derived from for-
eign law can raise important points and help provoke discussion in the
classroom.
Finally, legal educators can serve a broader function on campus by
helping non-law students in exercise science and sports management to
gain an understanding of the basic legal issues and institutional frame-
work arising out of international competition. In lecturing to undergrad-
uates, my own approach has been to use a single, highly visible problem,
such as drug testing, to explore the practical implications of legal doc-
trine and institutional alternative. Two hours is normally sufficient to
cover the basic issues.
V. CONCLUSION
As we approach a new millennium, the agenda for globalizing sports
law is daunting. Moving forward in a spirit of collaboration, we certainly
do not have to revert to the Roman law of the last millennium; only in
Rome are we supposed to do as the Romans do. But when in London or
Monaco we may sometimes have to do as Londoners or Monacons do.
What is more, we may sometimes want to do as they do in London or
Monaco. And we will need to broaden our horizons and those of others
in sports management and the legal profession.
The American sports arena is located right on a global commons
where more and more competition takes place. Like the Fabronis of two
hundred years ago in Tuscany, we will have to put up with stray balls
from near and far. We will all have to learn the rules of a global game.
We will all have to learn more about foreign law and more about the
process of international sports law. And we will have to train profes-
sionals to expect globalization of the sports arena. 69
69. The field is young but growing fast. The first textbook on international sports law,
NAFZiGER, supra note 24, was published in 1988. In just ten years since publication of that
text, the disciplinary focus has shifted substantially from its focus on international politics and
the amateur-professional distinction to marketing, drug testing, and the complex framework
of dispute resolution.
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